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NOTES 
Balancing Commerce, History, and Geography: Defining the 
Navigable Waters of the United States 
John F. Baughman 
Two tests combine to define federal admiralty jurisdiction.1 Under 
the threshold "locus" test, the alleged wrong must have occurred on 
"navigable waters."2 Under the secondary "nexus" test, the act giving 
rise to liability must bear a "significant relationship" to "traditional 
maritime activity."3 Historically, admiralty jurisdiction depended 
only on the locus, or "pure locality," test. Between 1972 and 1982 the 
Supreme Court added the nexus test4 in response to academic criticism 
of the pure locality test, 5 resistance from the lower courts, 6 and practi-
1. For purposes of this Note, whether the cases discussed were decided before or after the 
1966 merger of the admiralty "side" of the federal docket into the general pool of civil actions is 
not important. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 
§ 1-1, at 2 (2d ed. 1975). Cases are discussed without reference to the special procedures for-
merly used in admiralty. 
2. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1866). 
3. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 673 (1982). Recently the nexus test was 
modified to require both that "[t]he type of incident ... [be] likely to disrupt commercial activ-
ity," and that there be "a substantial relationship between the activity giving rise to the incident 
and traditional maritime activity." Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2896-97 (1990). See Daniel 
J. Capra, Discretion Must Be Controlled, Judicial Authority Circumscribed, Federalism Presen•ed, 
Plain Meaning Enforced, and Everything Must Be Simplified: Recent Supreme Court Contribu-
tions to Federal Civil Practice, 50 Mo. L. REv. 632, 657 (1991). The locus test remains 
unchanged. 
4. The Court first adopted the nexus test for the limited category of aviation accidents. See 
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). Subsequently, the 
nexus test was applied to all admiralty cases. Foremost, 457 U.S. at 673-74. A number of au-
thors have explored the contours of the Court's new nexus test. See, e.g., Mary K. DePoy, Note, 
Pleasure Boat Torts in Admiralty Jurisdiction: Satisfying the Maritime Nexus Standard, 34 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 121 (1977); Phyllis D. Camilla & Michael P. Drzal, Foremost Insurance 
Co. v. Richardson: If This Is Water, It Must Be Admiralty, 59 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1983); Alan J, 
Kaplan, Case Note, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1071 (1973); D.T. Plunkett, Recent Devel-
opment, Sisson v. Ruby: Muddying the Waters of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 65 TUL. L. REV. 697 
(1991); David R. Priddy, Pleasure Boating Under Admiralty Jurisdiction: An Unwarranted Ex-
pansion of Federal Authority, 12 CAP. U. L. REv. 545 (1983). 
5. E.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL CoURTS 227-32 (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY]; 7A JAMES w. MOORE 
& ALFRED s. PELAEZ, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ .325[3] (2d ed. 1988); DePoy, supra note 
4; Note, Pleasure-Boating and the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 STAN. L. REV. 724 (1958); Charles 
L. Black, Jr., Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259 (1950); 
Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CAL. L. REV. 661 (1963); Austin 
T. Wright, Unifonnity in the Maritime Law of the United States, 73 U. PA. L. REV. 123 (1925). 
6. E.g., Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972). In both 
Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 256-57, and Foremost, 457 U.S. at 673, the Court cited academic and 
judicial criticism as factors influencing their adoption of the nexus test; Chapman v. City of 
1028 
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cal necessity.7 The principal shortcomings of the pure locality test 
were that it created federal jurisdiction over seemingly trivial cases, 8 
and that it was sometimes difficult to apply.9 
Unfortunately, adding the nexus test did not address all of the lo-
cus test's limitations, and the locus test remains difficult to apply in 
some contemporary circumstances. Consequently, lower courts have 
developed at least two competing definitions of navigable waters. 
Some courts define as navigable only those waters that currently sup-
port, or are likely to support, commercial shipping; 10 others include all 
waters that could possibly support such traffic. 11 
The traditional locus test is difficult to apply in a· modern setting 
because rules developed to meet the needs of sailing ships and cargo 
vessels often adapt poorly to contemporary admiralty cases, which 
may involve water skiers12 or people swimming off a public dock. 13 In 
response, some courts have narrowed the locus test to dispose of cases 
they were unable to dismiss under the nexus test. 14 For example, an 
unbroken chain of Supreme Court precedents indicates that most, 15 if 
not all, 16 accidents involving pleasure boats are properly heard in ad-
miralty.17 The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the activities 
of pleasure boats qualify as traditional maritime activity.18 Courts, 
Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967); McDonald v. City of New York, 36 F.2d 714 
(2d Cir. 1929); Campbell v. H. Hackenfeld & Co., 125 F. 696 (9th Cir. 1903); Hastings v. Mann, 
226 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.C. 1964), affd., 340 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 
(1965); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 203 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1962), modified, 316 F.2d 758 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 940 (1963). 
7. The facts of Executive Jet illustrate the practical shortcomings of the pure locality test. 
The case concerned a commercial airplane that crashed on takeoff into Lake Erie after hitting a 
flock of seagulls. The Court refused to decide whether the locus of the accident was over land or 
over water and held that the case should not be heard in admiralty because the event did not 
"bear a sufficient relationship to traditional maritime activity." 409 U.S. at 271. 
8. The most persistent criticism was that the pure locality test included all accidents involv-
ing pleasure boats. See citations supra note 5; infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. 
9. See supra note 7. 
10. See, e.g., Livingston v. United States, 627 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1980); see infra section II.A. 
11. See, e.g., Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1983); see infra section 11.B. 
12. One current rule applicable to accidents involving water skiers is that admiralty jurisdic-
tion is appropriate only when the complaint alleges a navigational error. See, e.g., Hogan v. 
Overman, 767 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1985). Such a distinction is an example of the use of the nexus 
test to determine admiralty jurisdiction. 
13. See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967). 
14. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 575 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1978); Adams v. Montana 
Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975); Reed v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ind. 
1984); Dunham v. Demaine, 559 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1983). 
15. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982). 
16. Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2901 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
17. The Court has heard at least five cases concerning pleasure boats. Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. 
Ct. 2892 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982); Levinson v. Deupree, 
345 U.S. 648 (1953); Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 
(1941). 
18. Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674; Sisson, 110 S. Ct. at 2901 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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therefore, cannot use the nexus test to decline jurisdiction over plea-
sure boat torts. Consequently, the only way for lower courts to de-
cline jurisdiction is to apply the locus test to find that the tort did not 
occur on navigable waters. Such decisions misuse the jurisdictional 
locus test to achieve a substantive result. 19 
Despite the confusion, it remains desirable for plaintiffs in some 
situations, and for defendants in others, to have the case heard in ad-
miralty.20 All parties, therefore, have an interest in having the naviga-
ble waters of the United States clearly defined. A precise and stable 
definition also serves the courts' own interests of judicial economy and 
ease of administration. 21 
This Note develops a simple set of principles useful for defining 
navigable waters in a contemporary context. Part I considers why fed-
eral admiralty jurisdiction exists, and traces the evolution of the 
phrase navigable waters as a term of art. Part II analyzes the conflict-
ing contemporary definitions of navigable waters. Part III resolves the 
conflict by proposing guidelines that address the major concerns of all 
competing definitions. The system advocated is consistent with the 
goals of admiralty, constitutionally sound, easy to apply, and focuses 
attention on the nexus test to resolve the issue of whether particular 
cases "belong" in admiralty. 
I. HISTORY, POLICY, COMMERCE, AND THE DEFINITION OF 
NAVIGABLE WATERS 
This Part examines the historical development of, and policy rea-
sons for, a distinct federal admiralty jurisdiction. The standard of 
navigability developed in this Note is designed to complement these 
origins and goals. Section I.A reviews the origin of federal maritime 
jurisdiction and suggests that history is ambiguous with regard to 
what interests federal admiralty courts were intended to serve. Section 
l.B explains that, although admiralty jurisdiction is independent of the 
federal interest in interstate commerce, maritime activity and inter-
19. See ALI STUDY, supra note 5, at 227-28. 
20. A plaintiff might prefer admiralty jurisdiction for several reasons: to obtain federal juris-
diction when there is no diversity of citizenship, e.g., Marroni v. Matey, 492 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. 
Pa. 1980); to be classified as a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988), e.g., 
Jones v. Duke Power Co., 501 F. Supp. 713 (W.D.N.C. 1980); to sue under the Suits in Admi-
ralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1988), instead of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2671-80 (1988), e.g., Respess v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1984); to sue under 
the federal maritime wrongful death cause of action, e.g., Truehart v. Blandon, 672 F. Supp. 929 
(E.D. La. 1987); to have a cause of action under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensa-
tion Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1988), e.g., Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 
(1969). A defendant might prefer admiralty: to take advantage of the Limitation of Liability 
Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-96 (1988), e.g., Three Buoys Houseboats v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775 (8th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 272 (1991); or where the United States is a defendant, because 
the statute of limitations under the Suits in Admiralty Act may be shorter than that under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
21. Sisson, 110 S. Ct. at 2902 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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state commerce are often impossible to separate, making analysis of 
"pure" admiralty questions difficult. Section I.C traces the evolution 
of the term navigable waters and describes the various contexts in 
which it is employed. 
A. The History and Purpose of Admiralty 
Commentators agree that to make "any sense at all,"22 federal ad-
miralty courts must serve some compelling federal interest that would 
be frustrated by leaving matters to adjudication in state courts.23 Pre-
cisely identifying that compelling interest, however, is difficult. Most 
frequently mentioned are the need to apply a uniform body of law,24 
and the unique needs of the commercial shipping industry.25 Some 
courts have combined these interests and defined uniformity as the 
mechanism that achieves the more substantive goal of regulating the 
shipping industry.26 Whether this interpretation accurately reflects 
the historical origins of the admiralty courts, however, is unclear. 
The Framers' intent in including "all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction" in the federal judicial power is frustratingly ob-
scure. 27 There is no evidence of substantive debate over the matter at 
the Constitutional Convention,28 and the matter was apparently so un-
controversial as to merit a mere two lines in The Federalist. 29 
The First Congress included admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
22. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 29. 
23. See id.: Black, supra note 5, at 261·64. 
24. See, e.g .• ALI STUDY, supra note 5, at 227. 
25. See MOORE & PELAEZ, supra note 5, ~.325[3], at 328-31 (Supp. 1991-92). 
26. See, e.g .. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975). 
27. U.S. CoNsr. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3. Commentators debate why the Constitution refers to 
both "admiralty" and "maritime" jurisdiction instead of one or the other, and whether the terms 
refer to different things. See generally MOORE & PELAEZ, supra note 5, ~.200[1] n. l, at 2011; 1 
STEVEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 101, at 7-2 - 7-4 (7th ed. 1988). In 1833, 
Justice Story suggested that the word maritime was intended to ensure a broad interpretation of 
the word admiralty. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSI'ITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES§ 1666, at 466-67 (5th ed. 1891), cited in DAVID W. ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY AND FED-
ERALISM 6 (1970). Since 1925, however, the conventional wisdom has been that inclusion of the 
term maritime was essentially an afterthought of little constitutional significance. Harrington 
Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CoRNELL L.Q. 460, 469 
(1925). This explanation has been criticized as historically inaccurate, ROBINSON, supra, at 6-17, 
but the matter is now of purely academic significance. Courts do not distinguish between admi-
ralty and maritime cases and for all practical purposes the terms are synonyms. See MOORE & 
PELAEZ, supra note 5, ~ .200[1] n.1, at 2011. The only possible exception is that maritime may 
occasionally be used to refer specifically to the sea, not freshwater. See FRIEDELL, supra, § 103, 
at 7-5 - 7-6. In this Note the terms admiralty jurisdiction and maritime jurisdiction are used 
interchangeably. 
28. Putnam, supra note 27, at 460. 
29. The most bigotted idolizers of state authority have not thus far shown a disposition to 
deny the national judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes. These so generally depend 
on the laws of nations and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within 
the considerations which are relative to the public peace. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 590-91 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864). 
1032 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1028 
in the powers conferred on the newly established federal courts by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.30 Because the Act used virtually the same lan-
guage as the Constitution,31 determining the jurisdictional and sub-
stantive limits of admiralty is a question of constitutional 
interpretation to be decided by the judiciary. 32 
Unfortunately, what the Framers intended the federal admiralty 
jurisdiction to include is just as uncertain as why they created it at 
all.33 Consequently, in the first half of the nineteenth century the 
Supreme Court struggled to identify both the source of law to be ap-
plied in, and the interests served by, the federal admiralty courts.34 In 
1847 the Court finally concluded that admiralty is based on general 
principles of law used by all maritime nations. 35 The result is that 
today in admiralty cases federal courts apply a body of judge-made 
law consisting of "an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modi-
fications of those rules, and newly created rules."36 The definition of 
navigable waters is just such an amalgamated rule. 
During the Supreme Court's first century, when the underlying 
purpose of admiralty was more at issue than it is today, the Court 
identified three justifications for maintaining federal jurisdiction. 
Practically, federal jurisdiction produces a more uniform body of law 
than does state adjudication.37 More fundamentally, because of its re-
30. 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
31. "[A]ll civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." 1 Stat. 77, § 9 (1789). 
32. We look upon [the Judiciary Act of 1789] as legislative action contemporary with the 
first being of the constitution, expressive of the opinion of some of its framers, that the grant 
of admiralty jurisdiction was to be interpreted by the courts in accordance with the ac-
knowledged principles of general admiralty law. 
Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (S How.) 4S6, 470 (1847). The limit of admiralty jurisdiction "[i]s to 
be ascertained by a reasonable and just construction of the words used in the constitution, taken 
in connection with the whole instrument, and the purposes for which admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction was granted to the Federal Government." The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 
Black) S22, S27 (1862). 
33. Wright, supra note S, at 129. 
34. In 181S, Justice Story wrote an exhaustive 26-page opinion analyzing the possible sources 
of American maritime law. He considered the law employed by English admiralty courts at the 
time of the American Revolution; the law exercised by the English courts in the seventeenth 
century before their jurisdiction was greatly curtailed; the law employed in the colonies at the 
time of the revolution, which was more extensive than that in England itself; "the ancient and 
original jurisdiction, ipherent in the admiralty of England by virtue of its general organization." 
De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 181S) (No. 3776). Story concluded that 
"[t]he language of the Constitution will therefore warrant the most liberal interpretation," mean-
ing that admiralty in this country is based on general principles used by all maritime nations. 7 
F. Cas. at 418. 
3S. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (S How.) 4S6 (1847); see also Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 
U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 3S (1871) (explicitly affirming De Lovio). 
36. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 8S8, 86S (1986). 
37. Federal jurisdiction avoided the "difficulties" and "evils" that resulted from the separate 
exercise of admiralty power by individual states before 1789. Waring, 46 U.S. at 462. In addi-
tion to uniformity for the sake of consistency, the Framers may have been concerned that indi-
vidual states would unfairly discriminate in cases involving their citizens. See The Lottawanna, 
88 U.S. (21 Wall) SSS (1874), which concerned the ability of a state to create causes of action in 
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lation to international trade and war, admiralty jurisdiction was seen 
as an essential attribute of national sovereignty. 38 By 1778, all of the 
original states had established admiralty courts. 39 With the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, the states ceded ~dmiralty jurisdiction (an 
attribute of their independent sovereignty) to the federal govern-
ment.40 The Supreme Court has viewed this transfer of sovereign 
power as complete.41 Finally, as described in section B, admiralty ju-
risdiction serves a special federal interest in regulating the waterways 
used in interstate commerce. 
In summary, because the Framers were silent on why they in-
cluded admiralty jurisdiction in the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
had to determine what federal interests admiralty is designed to serve. 
Most generally, admiralty has been defined as an attribute of sovereign 
power. More specifically, the Court has recognized that the federal 
government has interests in maintaining jurisdiction over the arteries 
of interstate commerce, in applying a uniform body of law, and in 
regulating maritime trade. 
B. The Relationship Between Admiralty and Commerce 
In 1852, in The Propeller Genesee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, the Supreme 
Court declared that admiralty jurisdiction does not depend on the fed-
aiimiralty. "[A] more rational view of the question demands an adverse ruling in order to pre-
serve harmony and logical consistency in the general system .... " 88 U.S. at 571. 
38. Hamilton's justification of a federal admiralty power, discussed supra note 29, is clearly 
based on a notion of national competence. Foreigners, he implies, should be dealt with on the 
national level. Similarly, because admiralty cases may frequently arise outside the borders of a 
state and may involve other countries, state adjudication is inappropriate. CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 1, at 2 (3d ed. 1976). In addition, 
the Supreme Court has frequently spoken of maritime law as a type of national power derived 
from the concept of sovereignty. See, e.g., Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 
How.) 296, 300-01 (1858). An example of a national concern best adjudicated in a federal system 
is the disposition of prizes. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(2) (1988). 
39. Putnam, supra note 27, at 461-63. Under the Articles of Confederation these courts 
functioned independently, see, e.g., Talbot v. The Commanders & Owners of Three Brigs, 1 U.S. 
(1 Dall.) 95 (Pa. 1784), although an appeal could be taken to Congress or to a committee ap-
pointed by Congress under some circumstances. Putnam, supra note 27, at 463. 
40. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 456, 462 (1847) ("The States ... yield[ed] admi-
ralty jurisdiction altogether to the United States."); Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. 
(20 How.) 296, 301 (1858); ERASTUS c. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY: ITS JURIS-
DICTION AND PRACTICE 16-17 (1870). 
41. "When, therefore, the exercise, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... was surren-
dered by each State to the Government of the United States, without an exception as to subjects 
or places, this court cannot interpolate one into the Constitution .•.. " Jackson v. The Steam-
boat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, at 298 (1858). This conception of the states as sovereign 
entities transferring power to the federal government is at odds with Justice Marshall's explicit 
rejection of this argument in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 402-05 (1819) 
("The government of the Union ... is emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In 
form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be 
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.") The Supreme Court, however, has always 
described maritime power as coming from the states. The Court has never explained why the 
admiralty power does not come from the people. 
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eral interest in regulating interstate commerce.42 The Court has use4 
this doctrine repeatedly to reject arguments that there is no federal 
jurisdiction over accidents involving vessels engaged in purely intra-
state commerce.43 Ultimately, the Court characterized such argu-
ments as "a complete misconception of what the admiralty jurisdiction 
is under the Constitution of the United States."44 
The Genesee Chief doctrine had three important consequences. 
First, it laid the groundwork for the strict locality rule for admiralty 
tort jurisdiction. 45 Second, it led to the rule that admiralty jurisdiction 
over contracts depends on their maritime nature, not on whether the 
contracts concern an interstate transaction.46 Third, it made possible 
the constitutional interpretation that the Article III grant of admiralty 
jurisdiction enables Congress to pass maritime legislation independent 
of the Commerce Clause.47 As a historical matter, this interpretation 
was necessary to expand federal authority beyond the constrictive lim-
its then placed on the federal commerce power.48 Congress has rarely 
exercised this maritime lawmaking power, however, and virtually all 
statutes regulating shipping, boating, and navigation are Commerce 
Clause statutes.49 Consequently, the relationship between admiralty 
42. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). "Nor can the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States be made to depend on regulations of commerce. They are entirely distinct things, having 
no necessary connection with one another, and are conferred in the Constitution by separate and 
distinct grants." 53 U.S. at 452. See generally MOORE & PELAEZ, supra note 5, at ~.200[4]. 
Justice McLean, concurring in The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. at 304, attempted to link admi-
ralty jurisdiction to the commerce power, but the full Court has never adopted his reasoning. 
43. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564-66 (1871); The Propeller Com-
merce, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 574, 579-80 (1862); see also The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 
(1874). As discussed infra note 66, debate remains over whether The Daniel Ball and The Mon-
tello established rules for admiralty or Commerce Clause cases. All that is relevant here, how-
ever, is that the operation of the vessels within a single state did not remove them from admiralty 
jurisdiction. 
44. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 279 U.S. 109, 124 
(1929). 
45. Expressed in rudimentary tenns in The Propeller Commerce, 66 U.S. at 579, the strict 
locality test was made explicit in the fonn that endured until 1972, in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 
Wall.) 20 (1865). 
46. See Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 29 (1871); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 624, 637 (1868). 
47. "It is unnecessary to invoke the power given to Congress to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, in order to find authority to pass the law in ques· 
tion." In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891); see also Romero v. International Terminal Operating 
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959); Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1924); 
Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 556-57 (1889); Note, From Judicial Grant to 
Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214 
(1954). 
48. In the nineteenth century intrastate commerce was a living concept. It would be almost a 
century before the Court found that even the most local transactions could "affect" interstate 
commerce and were therefore subject to federal regulation. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1 (1937). 
49. See, e.g., statutes codified in 33 U.S.C. § 5, Navigation and Navigable Waters (1988). 
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and commerce remains complicated. 
Furthermore, as discussed in section I.C, navigable waters are de-
fined in terms of their ability to support interstate commerce. If the 
only federal interest is the interstate shipment of goods by water, that 
could be comprehensively regulated through the Commerce Clause. 50 
However, the Admiralty Clause51 and the concern expressed in early 
cases that federal jurisdiction extend over waters tfo~t are "highways of 
commerce"52 evidence a broader concern with the interstate waters 
themselves. The federal interests in interstate commerce and in the 
movement of people across state lines were protected by asserting ju-
risdiction over the "highways" on which they moved. 
The federal interstate highway system provides a useful analogy. 
In Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 53 Justice Powell used the 
highway analogy to attack the assertion of admiralty jurisdiction over 
accidents involving pleasure boats. Powell claimed that "no one sug-
gests that federal jurisdiction is needed to prevent chaos in automobile 
traffic, or that only federal courts are qualified to try accident cases."54 
Powell was correct, but his argument overlooked a crucial distinction 
between interstate commerce conducted on water and on land. The 
federal courts, through the Admiralty Clause, have constitutional ju-
risdiction over both the situs and the instruments of waterborne com-
merce. No such jurisdiction exists over land traffic per se. If the 
federal courts had constitutional jurisdiction over all cases involving 
commerce, for instance, there would be federal jurisdiction over all 
cases involving interstate trucking. And, as is currently the case in 
admiralty, there would be vigorous debate over which traffic accidents 
sufficiently affect commerce that they should be heard in federal court. 
It is easy to imagine courts identifying certain roads as highways of 
interstate commerce and leaving the rest to local jurisdiction. 
Thus, there is a close relationship between the federal commerce 
power and admiralty jurisdiction. Although most affirmative regula-
tion of waterborne commerce is done under the Commerce Clause, 
there is an independent federal interest in the waterways on which the 
commerce moves. The definition of navigable waters delimits the 
scope of that distinct federal power. 
50. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), clearly established the constitutionality 
of congressional power over interstate navigation. The vast majority of regulatory statutes con-
cerning shipping and navigation have been passed under the Commerce Clause. See supra note 
49 and accompanying text. 
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
52. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1871). 
53. 457 U.S. 668 (1982). 
54. 457 U.S. at 682 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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C. The Evolution of the Term Navigable Waters 
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, ss the Supreme Court reviewed a 
century and a half of litigation over the definition of navigable waters 
and observed that the term had been used in a variety of unrelated 
contexts. s6 The Court announced that precedents defining navigable 
waters should be read in light of " 'the purpose for which the concept 
of "navigability" was invoked in a particular case.' "S7 In so doing, 
the Court implied that different definitions should apply in different 
circumstances. 
Prior to Kaiser Aetna, only a handful of lower courts distinguished 
different definitions of navigability.ss Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court itself frequently applied definitions developed in one context to 
unrelated cases. Nevertheless, assuming that such a classification is 
both important and possible, the definitions used to characterize admi-
ralty jurisdiction, the scope of congressional regulatory authority 
under the Commerce Clause, and state ownership of river and lake 
bottoms are described below.s9 
1. The Admiralty Definition 
In 1825, following the English example, the Court restricted admi-
ralty jurisdiction to waters within the "ebb and flow of the tide."60 In 
1852, this rule was discarded and admiralty jurisdiction was extended 
to all "public water used for commercial purposes or foreign trade. " 61 
55. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
56. The Court identified four: the boundaries of congressional regulatory authority under 
the Commerce Clause; admiralty jurisdiction; the extent of the authority of the Army Corps of 
Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899; and the limits of the naviga-
tional servitude. 444 U.S. at 171-72. 
57. 444 U.S. at 171 (quoting United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 49 (D. Haw. 
1976), modified, 584 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1978), revd., 444 U.S. 164 (1979)). 
58. E.g., Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975); The Lucky Lindy, 76 
F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1935); Doran v. Lee, 287 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1968); United States v. 
Banister Realty Co., 155 F. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1907). 
59. At least five articles have made extensive examinations of the various contexts in which 
definitions of navigable waters are used. David M. Guinn, An Analysis of Navigable Waters of the 
United States, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 559 (1966); Francis W. Laurent, Judicial Criteria of Naviga· 
bility in Federal Cases, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 8; Leighton L. Leighty, The Source and Scope of 
Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REv. 391 (1970); Merritt 
Starr, Navigable Waters of the United States - State and National Control, 35 HARV. L. REV. 
154 (1921); G. Graham Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10 BUFF. L. REV. 427 
(1961). All offer a more comprehensive classification than is necessary here. Other categories 
discussed include cases arising under treaties (Laurent, Leighty); arising under federal land 
grants (Laurent); involving citizens of different states (Laurent); involving questions of public 
rights (Leighty, Waite); and state power to zone waters for particular purposes (Waite). The 
three broad categories discussed in the text have been the source of the most Supreme Court 
litigation. 
60. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 428 (1825); see also The Orleans v. Phoebus, 
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175 (1837) (sea or tidewater). 
61. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851). Because 
The Genesee Chief concerned a collision on Lake Ontario the waters involved were in fact un-
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Shortly thereafter, the Court made clear that such waters would be 
within admiralty jurisdiction even if all navigable ports were located 
entirely within a single state or county, 62 as long as they could be used 
in interstate commerce. 63 In most admiralty cases, navigability is not 
an issue and thus when the Court announced the strict locality rule it 
said only that "the wrong and injury complained of must have been 
committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters."64 
The Daniel Ball 65 was the first case following adoption of the strict 
locality test in which navigability was at issue. 66 The defendant ar-
questionably navigable. The case is anomalous because it dealt with an 1845 federal statute that 
extended admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes and their connecting waters. The Court 
made clear, however, that the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized admiralty jurisdiction over in-
land admiralty and maritime cases, so that the waters in question would be covered even without 
the 1845 statute. This reasoning was given immediate effect in the Court's next case, Fretz v. 
Bull, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 466 (1851). For a short time it appeared that jurisdiction over the Great 
Lakes might rest on a different footing than that covering the rest of the country's inland waters. 
See The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1866). In 1869, however, the Court declared that 
the Act of 1845 "has become useless and of no effect." The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15, 26 
(1868). 
62. Jackson v. The Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 299 (1858). 
63. Nelson v. Leland, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 48, 56 (1859). 
64. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 35 (1865). The Plymouth also introduced a curious 
rule that admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to torts caused by actions on navigable waters 
that resulted in injuries on shore. This anomaly was reversed by statute. The Admiralty Exten-
sion Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 496, codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988). 
65. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871). 
66. The Daniel Ball and The Montello, discussed infra at notes 69-74 and accompanying text, 
are the two most important and often cited cases defining navigable waters. There is considera-
ble disagreement, however, as to whether they should be classified as admiralty or Commerce 
Clause cases. Both were actions brought by the United States against ships operating without the 
federal license required of all vessels on navigable waters. Proponents of the view that the defini-
tion of navigability developed in these precedents applies only to Commerce Clause cases base 
their argument on the fact that the underlying statutes were regulations adopted under the Com-
merce Clause. Laurent, supra note 59, at 25; Waite, supra note 59, at 442 n.61; see also Adams v. 
Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 1975). For two reasons, however, it makes 
more sense to regard these cases as defining navigable waters for admiralty cases as well as for 
Commerce Clause matters. First, they were admiralty cases. In each, the United States filed a 
libel in admiralty rather than bringing a law action. Second, in a series of "pure" admiralty 
cases, the Supreme Court cited the rules developed in The Daniel Ball and The Montello as 
controlling. Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1884); Ex parte Garnett, 141 U.S. l, 15 
(1891); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 26 (1903). If there was any doubt that The Daniel 
Ball and Montello definitions were not admiralty rules, these subsequent cases made them so. 
Extending this second argument, The Daniel Ball and The Montello should also be considered 
valid precedent for determining state ownership of river beds (and other questions of property 
ownership) because of the Supreme Court's extensive reliance on them in such cases. See Utah v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 15 (1935); United 
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926); 
Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 
U.S. 574, 586 n.2 (1922); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 323-24 (1917); Packer v. Bird, 137 
U.S. 661, 667 (1891). In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979), Justice Rehn-
quist cited The Daniel Ball and The Montello as Commerce Clause cases without discussion. 
Justice O'Connor, however, considers The Daniel Ball an admiralty case. Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 488 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a thorough analysis of 
The Daniel Ball as precedent, see Guinn, supra note 59, at 561-80. 
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gued that the Grand River in Michigan was not navigable. The Court 
replied: 
A different test must . . . be applied to determine the navigability of our 
rivers, and that is found in their navigable capacity. Those rivers must 
be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. 
And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of 
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over 
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes 
of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the 
United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradis-
tinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their 
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a con-
tinued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other 
States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such com-
merce is conducted by water. 67 
Using this test, the Court easily found the Grand River navigable be-
cause the evidence showed it was capable of supporting steamboat 
traftic.68 
The Montello, 69 which concerned the navigability of the Fox River 
in Wisconsin, presented a more difficult case. The case originally 
reached the Court in 1870 but, bec~mse of insufficient evidence regard-
ing the river itself, was remanded with instructions for the district 
court to apply The Daniel Ball test.10 The Court's decision when the 
case returned three years later71 is important for two reasons. 
First, the Court made clear that a finding of navigability did not 
depend on the ease or method of navigation: 
It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river 
was capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it could not be 
treated as a public highway. The capability of use by the public for pur-
poses of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the 
navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If 
it be capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, 
no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable 
in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway.72 
The Court did, however, add a small caveat. 
It is not, however, as Chief Justice Shaw said, "every small creek in 
which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water 
which is deemed navigable, but, in order to give it the character of a 
navigable stream, it must be generally and commonly useful to some 
purpose of trade or agriculture."73 
67. 77 U.S. at 563. 
68. 77 U.S. at 564. 
69. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 411 (1870), appeal after remand, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874). 
70. 78 U.S. at 415. 
71. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874). 
72. 87 U.S. at 441-42. 
73. 87 U.S. at 442 (citation omitted). The Court's quotation of what might be termed the 
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Second, the Court found that navigability could be established on the 
basis of historical records of commercial navigation~ The Court based 
its finding of navigability on evidence that the Fox River was traveled 
by explorers in 1673, was used by fur trappers in the eighteenth cen-
tury, and was used as an artery of commerce by animal-drawn Dur-
ham boats in the nineteenth century. 74 
Subsequent decisions based on The Daniel Ball and The Montello 
extended the admiralty jurisdiction to artificial waterways such as 
canals, 75 even when located entirely within a single state, as long as 
the waterway afforded a highway for interstate commerce. 76 The 
Court made clear that admiralty jurisdiction applied to vessels en-
gaged in purely intrastate commerce on a river located entirely within 
one state, because rivers eventually empty into a sea, bay, or gulf.77 
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on what constitutes naviga-
bility in the admiralty context since 1903.78 
2. The Commerce Clause Definition 
Federal Commerce Clause power over navigable waters originally 
derived from such waters' susceptibility to use in interstate com-
merce. 79 Gradually, however, the federal power extended beyond con-
cern for navigation to include dams80 and other structures, such as 
levees, drains, and flood control plans, that affect the waterway itself. 81 
In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 82 the Court held 
that federal power over waterways is not limited to regulating naviga-
tion. "In truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of 
"Shaw caveat" is interesting because the case cited was a property case. Rowe v. Gran,ite Bridge 
Corp., 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 344 (1838). In Rowe, the plaintiffs alleged a public nuisance when the 
defendant constructed a road over a small creek that the plaintiffs claimed to have used for 
transporting hay. The Supreme Court's reliance on Rowe thus began a long history of applying 
definitions of navigability developed in one context to unrelated cases. Justice Rehnquist's decla-
ration in Kaiser Aetna that definitions developed in different contexts should be kept separate, see 
supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text, is at odds with the very foundation of the Supreme 
Court's navigability doctrine. 
74. 87 U.S. at 440-41. 
75. Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 632 (1884). 
76. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 28 (1903). 
77. See In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1891) (discussing cases). The river in question was 
located in two states, however, and emptied into the Atlantic Ocean. 
78. The Robert W. Parsons 191 U.S. 17 (1903). In the last case decided under the strict 
locality test the Supreme Court stated simply that "maritime law governs only those torts occur-
ring on the navigable waters of the United States." Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 
205 (1971). 
79. "Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the 
control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United 
States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie." Gilman v. City of 
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865). 
80. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). 
81. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900). 
82. 311 U.S. 377 (1940). 
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commerce on its. waters. Navigability . . . is but a part of this 
whole."83 Nevertheless, while Congress may exercise Commerce 
Clause power over waters for reasons unrelated to navigation, it may 
do so only over waters classified as navigable. 84 
Appalachian Electric modified The Daniel Ball definition of naviga-
bility in several ways. 85 The Court dropped the requirement that the 
waterway be navigable in its natural state. Rather, as long as a water-
way could be made navigable through reasonable improvements, it 
would qualify as navigable. It is not even necessary that the improve-
ments be made, or even authorized, just possible. 86 The court also 
endorsed the concept of "indelible navigability,"87 under which a wa-
terway once found to be navigable in fact remains permanently naviga-
ble in law. 88 Following the example set in The Montello, the 
Appalachian Electric decision also made extensive use of historical evi-
dence to demonstrate navigability. 89 Finally, the Court examined the 
physical characteristics of the river itself to demonstrate its capacity to 
support navigation.90 Under the Appalachian Electric doctrine the 
83. 311 U.S. at 426. 
84. Justice Rehnquist has reached a somewhat different conclusion. Referring to the quoted 
passage, he stated: 
Appalachian Power Co. indicates that congressional authority over the waters of this Nation 
does not depend on a stream's "navigability." •.. The cases that discuss Congress' para-
mount authority to regulate waters used in interstate commerce are consequently best un-
derstood when viewed in terms of more traditional Commerce Clause analysis than by 
reference to whether the stream in fact is capable of supporting navigation or may be char-
acterized as "navigable water of the United States." 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979). Justice Rehnquist's argument is uncon-
vincing. Ifhe were correct, then the contortions the Appalachian Electric Court went through to 
demonstrate that the stream in question was in fact navigable would have been unnecessary. See 
infra text accompanying notes 86-90. Furthermore, in referring to the "traditional Commerce 
Clause analysis," Justice Rehnquist cites Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
All three of these cases were decided within three years of Appalachian Electric. If the Appalach-
ian Electric Court had intended to use the "traditional Commerce Clause analysis," they surely 
were familiar with it. They invented it. 
85. In the 70 years before Appalachian Electric, however, the Court relied heavily on The 
Daniel Ball in Commerce Clause cases, often construing it more narrowly than in admiralty 
cases, probably reflecting the more limited doctrine of federal Commerce Clause power then 
applied by the Court. See supra note 48. In Escabana & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 682 (1883), the Court cited The Daniel Ball without comment to declare 
the Chicago River navigable for Commerce Clause purposes. In Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 
621, 632 (1900), the Court read The Daniel Ball and The Montello narrowly and imposed a 
requirement that navigable waters support "commerce of a substantial and permanent charac-
ter." In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899), the Court 
said "the mere fact that Jogs, poles and rafts are floated down a stream occasionally and in times 
of high water does not make it a navigable river." 
86. Appalachian Electric, 311 U.S. at 407-08. 
87. Guinn, supra note 59, at 563. 
88. 311 U.S. at 408. This principle was first articulated in Economy Light & Power Co. v. 
United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123-24 (1921). 
89. 311 U.S. at 413-19. 
90. 311 U.S. at 410-13. 
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definition of navigable waters is extremely broad - broader than the 
admiralty definition. 
3. State Ownership of River Bottoms 
The definition of navigability used to determine state ownership of 
submerged lands is closely associated with the equal footing doctrine 
under which new states admitted to the union acquire the same prop-
erty rights as the original thirteen.91 New states acquire title to all 
land beneath navigable waters within their borders on the date of 
statehood.92 The key question in cases of disputed ownership is 
whether the waters overlying the land in question were navigable on 
that date. 93 In these cases, the doctrine of indelible navigability ap-
plies. 94 A state could never lose title to a river bottom simply because 
the river is no longer used for navigation. 
Although title cases have relied heavily on the definitions of navi-
gability developed in The Daniel Ball and The Montello, 95 courts have 
focused on whether a waterway is capable of being used for commer-
cial navigation; whether it actually is or has been navigated is less im-
portant. 96 In resolving questions of navigability for title, the Supreme 
Court has relied on four types of evidence: the physical characteristics 
of the waterway, such as its depth and volume of flow;97 historical 
records of navigation;98 contemporary use by pleasure craft;99 and de-
91. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
92. "[U]pon the admission of the State of Alabama into the Union, the title in the lands 
below high water mark of navigable waters passed to the State, and could not afterwards be 
granted away by the Congress of the United States." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 27 (1894). 
The state's title is, however, subject to the "navigational servitude," under which the federal 
government may exercise its Commerce Clause power over navigable waters. Oregon ex rel 
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1977). 
93. See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 73 (1931); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 
1, 6 (1935). 
94. Guinn, supra note 59, at 565. 
95. See e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 
1, 15 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 
U.S. 49, 56 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922); 
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922). 
96. The question of that susceptibility in the ordinary condition of the rivers, rather than 
of the mere manner or extent of actual use, is the crucial question .... The extent of existing 
commerce is not the test. The evidence of the actual use of streams, and especially of exten-
sive and continued use for commercial purposes, may be most persuasive, but where condi-
tions of exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the 
susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily proved. 
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931). 
97. Utah v. United States, 403" U.S. at 12; United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 15; United 
States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 77-81; United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 52-53, 56-57; 
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. at 586-87. 
98. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 11-12; United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 81; United 
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 15; Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. at 586-87; Holt State Bank, 270 
U.S. at 57. 
99. In United States v. Oregon, evidence that duck hunters and pleasure boaters had failed in 
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terminations of navigability by administrative agencies or state 
courts.100 Courts may also take judicial notice when waterways are 
commonly considered navigable. tot The net result is that a body of 
water may be considered navigable in title actions based on very 
scanty evidence of historical use, even when not currently used for any 
purpose.102 
II. CONFLICTING CONTEMPORARY DEFINITIONS OF 
NAVIGABILITY 
The Supreme Court's long silence on the definition of navigable 
waters for admiralty purposes, its frequent reliance on definitions de-
veloped in Commerce Clause or property cases, and uncertainty over 
the interests served by federal admiralty courts have led to conflict 
among the courts of appeals over the proper definition of navigabil-
ity. to3 The major area of disagreement concerns the amount of com-
merce a waterway must presently support to be considered navigable. 
A second issue is whether admiralty jurisdiction may ever exist over 
waters landlocked in a single state, and conversely, whether interstate 
waters may ever be excluded from admiralty. 
This Part describes the two definitions of navigability currently in 
use. Section II.A describes the "contemporary navigability-in-fact" 
standard that requires evidence of ongoing or reasonably likely com-
mercial activity. Section II.B describes the "navigational capacity" 
standard that requires only that commerce be possible. Section II.C 
considers whether waters navigable in admiralty must be part of an 
interstate nexus in order to fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction. 
attempts to use small boats on a lake was persuasive evidence against a finding of navigability. 
295 U.S. at 21-23. The Court's consideration of this evidence, however, suggests that evidence of 
regular use of a waterway by pleasure craft would support a finding of navigability for title 
purposes. 
100. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 23. Such determinations, however, are not control-
ling. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. at 585 (opinion of surveying officers that the Red River 
was navigable not dispositive). Ultimate resolution of navigability is a federal question not sub-
ject to adjudication in state courts. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55. 
101. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 77. 
102. For instance, the Great Salt Lake was determined to be navigable on evidence of (1) 
"nine boats used from time to time to haul cattle and sheep from the mainland to one of the 
islands,'' by their owners; (2) "one boat used by an outsider who carried sheep to an island for 
the owners of the sheep"; (3) "a boat known as the City of Corrine which was launched in May 
1871 for the purpose of carrying passengers and freight; but its life in that capacity apparently 
lasted less than a year. In 1872 it was converted into an excursion boat which apparently plied 
the waters of the lake until 1881"; (4) "other boats that hauled sheep to and from an island in the 
lake and also hauled ore, and salt, and cedar posts"; (5) "another boat ••. used to carry salt from 
various salt works around the lake to a railroad connection"; (6) The fact that the lake was 30.2 
feet deep on the date Utah became a state. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 11-12. 
103. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties faced by a district court attempting to 
decide whether admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate, see Wilder v. Placid Oil Co., 611 F. Supp. 
841, 845-47 (W.D. La. 1985), affd sub nom. Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374 (Sth Cir. 
1988). 
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This Part concludes that although the first definition better reflects 
modem circumstances, the second is more faithful to the underlying 
goals of admiralty. Consequently, elements of each definition will be 
combined in the analytical framework proposed in Part III. 
A. The Contemporary Navigability-in-Fact Standard 
The narrower of the two rules defining navigability for admiralty 
purposes requires that the waters in question actually support com-
mercial shipping, or have a "present capacity to sustain commercial 
shipping."104 Read closely, this rule has a "hard" and a "soft" ver-
sion. The hard version, first developed by the Eighth Circuit in Liv-
ingston v. United States, 105 has been read to require evidence of actual 
contemporary commercial use. 106 The soft version, developed by the 
Ninth Circuit in Adams v. Montana Power Co., 107 and endorsed by the 
Seventh Circuit in Chapman v. United States, 108 states that "admiralty 
jurisdiction need and should extend only to those waters traversed or 
susceptible of being traversed by commercial craft."109 
The term susceptible as used in this context does not mean physi-
cally capable, but rather, likely.110 Adams concerned a boating acci-
dent in Montana on an artificial lake formed between two dams on the 
Missouri River. 111 Chapman concerned a similar accident on the 
104. Goodman v. 1973 26 Foot Trojan Vessel, 859 F.2d 71, 73 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988). 
105. 627 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1980). 
106. See, e.g., Reed v. United States, 604 F. Supp. 1253, 1267 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Motley v. 
Hale, 567 F. Supp. 39, 40 (W.D. Va. 1983); Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191, 193 
(W.D. Mo. 1980); see also Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir. 1983). 
107. 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975). In a subsequent case, however, the Ninth Circuit charac-
terized its Adams holding in a way that appears to endorse the hard version of the rule. "Because 
we concluded that none of the activities on the river constituted commerce, we held the action 
was not cognizable in admiralty." In re Paradise Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986). 
108. 575 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978). The contemporary 
navigability in fact standard has also been implemented by at least four district courts in circuits 
where the court of appeals had not previously ruled on the issue. Seymour v. United States, 744 
F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Ga. 1990); Reynolds v. Bradley, 644 F. Supp. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Motley 
v. Hale, 567 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Va. 1983); Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. La. 
1981). Motley and Smith seem contrary to cases subsequently decided by the courts of appeals in 
their circuits. Price v. Price, 929 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1991); Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 641 
F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1981), affd. sub nom. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982). 
109. Adams, 528 F.2d at 439. 
110. "The issue .•. is whether . . . admiralty jurisdiction extends .•• over waters that, 
although navigable and used for commercial transportation in the past, are now used and likely 
to be used only for recreational activities." Chapman, 575 F.2d at 147. Another definition of 
admiralty jurisdiction that has been used is "actual or reasonably potential navigability." Mar-
roni v. Matey, 492 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting United States v. Stoeco Homes, 
498 F.2d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975)). The Marroni decision 
illustrates the difficulty lower courts have in applying the various definitions of navigable waters 
because Stoeco Homes was not an admiralty case; it concerned alleged violations of the Rivers 
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899. Stoeco Homes, 498 F.2d at 600. 
111. The dams were 25 miles apart and neither had locks. 528 F.2d at 439. 
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Kankakee River in Illinois.112 In both cases, and in several others ap-
plying the contemporary navigability-in-fact standard, the watenvay 
either previously had supported, or was physically capable of support-
ing, commercial activity. 113 
The strongest argument supporting the contemporary navigability-
in-fact standard is that, because admiralty exists only to serve the na-
tional interest in commercial shipping, there is no federal interest to 
protect if there is no shipping. 114 This argument relies heavily on Kai-
ser Aetna's admonition that definitions of navigability should reflect 
the purpose they serve. 115 It is a strong policy argument but requires a 
carefully made distinction between the federal interest in maintaining 
admiralty jurisdiction over navigable waters from the "intense" fed-
eral interest in uniform regulations governing safety, navigation, and 
other concerns regulated under the Commerce Clause. 116 
An important corollary to the argument that admiralty jurisdiction 
should not exist in the absence of commerce derives from The Genesee 
Chief precedent that as maritime commerce expands, admiralty juris-
diction expands with it. By analogy, when commercial shipping stops 
on a particular waterway it should cease to be considered navigable for 
admiralty purposes.117 This argument rejects the Appalachian Electric 
doctrine of immutable navigability in the admiralty context. Histori-
cally, however, many lower courts deciding admiralty cases have ap-
112. 575 F.2d at 147. 
113. Chapman, 515 F.2d at 147; Adams, 528 F.2d at 440. In Minix v. Fellers, 654 F. Supp. 
1127 (N.D. Cal. 1987), the court states: 
Although past activities and conditions of Clear Lake indicate the presence of previous in-
terstate commerce, the activities and condition of Clear Lake now and at the time of the 
subject accident are and were non-commercial and intrastate. In addition, the condition and 
location of the lake do not make it susceptible to interstate commerce in the future. 
654 F. Supp. 1129. See also Motley v. Hale, 567 F. Supp. 39, 40 (W.D. Va. 1983) (refusing to 
consider plaintiff's evidence of historic navigability); Dunham v. DeMaine, 559 F. Supp. 224, 
225 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (Lake Hamilton held not navigable for admiralty although it "historically 
had been navigable in its natural state"); Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. 
La. 1981) (Lake Bistineau no longer navigable for admiralty purposes). 
114. The Ninth Circuit wrote: 
The logic of requiring commercial activity is evident. The purpose behind the grant of ad-
miralty jurisdiction is the protection and promotion of the maritime shipping industry 
through the development and application, by neutral federal courts, of a uniform and spe-
cialized body of federal law .... In the absence of commercial activity, present or potential, 
there is no federal interest justifying the frustration of legitimate state interests. 
Adams, 528 F.2d at 439 (footnote omitted); see also Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. v. 
Morts, 878 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (Three Buoys I}, vacated and remanded 110 S. Ct. 3265 
(1990), modified, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990) (Three Buoys JI}, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 272 
(1991); Livingston v. United States, 627 F.2d 165, 169-70 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
914 (1981); Chapman, 515 F.2d at 149-50; Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191, 193 (W.D. 
Mo. 1980). 
115. See, e.g., Three Buoys IL 921 F.2d at 778; Livingston, 627 F.2d at 169. 
116. Land and Lake Tours Inc. v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1038 (1984); see also Adams, 528 F.2d at 440. 
117. Livingston, 627 F.2d at 169; Chapman, 515 F.2d at 149; Adams, 528 F.2d at 440; Du11-
ham, 559 F. Supp. at 225. 
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plied the Appalachian Electric doctrine, 118 although the Supreme 
Court has never done so.119 If the Appalachian Electric doctrine 
should not apply, then it is logically sound to argue that waters previ-
ously held navigable for admiralty purposes should drop out of admi-
ralty jurisdiction when commercial navigation stops. 
Some courts have also suggested that The Daniel Ball and The 
Montello may require use of the contemporary navigability-in-fact 
standard.12° The Daniel Ball and The Montello do contain language 
very similar to that used to define the contemporary navigability-in-
fact standard.121 Such an argument, however, ignores The Monte/Io's 
extensive use of historical evidence to support a finding of 
navigability. 122 
A final argument advanced in favor of the contemporary navigabil-
ity-in-fact standard is that a narrow definition of navigability would 
reduce the caseload of the federal courts. 123 This argument goes hand 
in hand with Justice Powell's complaint in dissent that the majority in 
Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson - the case that added the nexus 
test - expanded admiralty jurisdiction "to the edge of absurdity."124 
118. Jones v. Duke Power Co., 501 F. Supp. 713 (W.D.N.C. 1980), affd., 672 F.2d 910 (4th 
Cir. 1981); Clinton Bd. of Park Commrs. v. Claussen, 410 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Dow 
Chem. Co. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1971), affd., 463 F.2d 120 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr., & Assocs., 328 F. Supp. 
54 (W.D. Ark. 1971), affd., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972); Dardar v. Louisiana, 322 F. Supp. 1115 
(E.D. La. 1971), affd. sub nom. Dardar v. Louisiana State Dept. of Highways, 447 F.2d 952 (5th 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Builders Supply Co. v. Chris Craft, 278 F. Supp. 
254 (N.D. Iowa 1968); In re River Queen, 275 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Ark. 1967), affd. sub nom. 
George v. Beavark, Inc., 402 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1968); Madole v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379 
(W.D. La. 1965); In re Howser, 227 F. Supp. 81 (W.D.N.C. 1964); Johnson v. Wurthman, 227 F. 
Supp. 135 (D. Or. 1964); Shogry v. Lewis, 225 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1964); In re Madsen, 187 
F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); Mase v. Keller, 149 F. Supp. 513 (D. Minn. 1956). 
119. Guinn, supra note 59, at 576, states "[a]lthough Appalachian is not an admiralty case, 
the Supreme Court's inclusion of it in decisions concerning admiralty matters makes it essential 
that its concepts be included in determining any rule of navigability for admiralty purposes." 
Guinn cites no cases to support this proposition and none have been found. 
120. Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. v. Morts, 878 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(Three Buoys I), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 3265, modified, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(Three Buoys II), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 272 (1991); Reynolds v. Bradley, 644 F. Supp. 42, 45-45 
(N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
121. E.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) ("[Waters] are navigable in 
fact when they are used or are susceptible of being used ... as highways for commerce .... "); 
The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874) ("The capability of use by the public for 
purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a 
river .... "). 
122. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
123. See Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 440-41 (9th Cir. 1975). 
124. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 678 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); see 
also Motley v. Hale, 567 F. Supp. 39, 40 (W.D. Va. 1983) (quoting Powell); Camilla & Drzal, 
supra note 4, at 1 (quoting Powell). Criticism of "expanding" federal admiralty jurisdiction is 
nothing new. See Notes, Extension of Federal Jurisdiction over State Canals, 37 AM. L. REV. 911 
(1903), for two colorful quotations. 
Another downward surge has been taken upon the level of the Federal ratchet. The weight 
has been lifted to a new point. The tooth has caught in a new notch. The weight will never 
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This interpretation of Foremost is wrong. Foremost did nothing to ex-
pand admiralty jurisdiction that was defined previously by only the 
pure locality test. 125 The addition of the nexus test could only have 
the effect of reducing the number of cases arising in admiralty. As the 
Foremost majority recognized, "[under the strict locality test] there 
was little question that a complaint such as the one filed here stated a 
cause of action within federal admiralty jurisdiction."126 The real 
complaint of the Foremost dissent and some lower court decisions ad-
vocating a narrow definition of navigable waters is that torts involving 
pleasure boats do not belong in admiralty. 127 Such concerns may be 
valid, but they should be dealt with under the nexus test, not by 
manipulating the definition of navigable waters. 
The foregoing reveals two strong arguments for restricting admi-
ralty jurisdiction to waters that presently support or are likely to sup-
port commercial navigation: the generally assumed, albeit historically 
uncertain, 128 reasoning that admiralty exists only to further the federal 
interest in creating a uniform body oflaw for maritime commerce; and 
the argument that admiralty jurisdiction should not anachronistically 
remain after a waterway falls out of commercial use. Other arguments 
for the contemporary navigability-in-fact standard - based on a sus-
pect reading of precedent or a desire to limit the federal caseload by 
excluding cases involving pleasure boats - are misplaced. 
B. The Navigational Capacity Standard 
The navigational capacity standard does not require actual or 
probable commerce. It asks only whether a waterway is "susceptible 
or capable of being used as an interstate highway of commerce."129 
"Susceptible or capable" in this context means physically capable. 130 
descend. The contrivance is of such a nature that it works only in one way - moves the 
weight only in one direction. 
Id. at 913. "It was said of the late Justice Story, that if a bucket of water were brought into his 
court with a com cob floating in it, he would at once extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the 
United States over it." Id. at 916. 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9. 
126. 457 U.S. at 672. 
127. Richardson, 451 U.S. at 678-86 (Powell, J., dissenting); Chapman v. United States, 575 
F.2d 147, 150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978) (quoting Adams); Adams, 528 F.2d nt 
440; Motley v. Hale, 567 F. Supp. 39, 40-41 (W.D. Va. 1983); Marroni v. Matey, 492 F. Supp. 
340, 342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
128. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. 
129. Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir. 1983). 
130. An alternate formulation of the test would define a waterway as navigable ifthere is any 
evidence of past or present commercial use, or if "it could be made suitable for use in the future 
by reasonable improvements." Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Federal Power Commn., 344 
F.2d 594, 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 832 (1965). Rochester Gas was a Commerce 
Clause case, and because its criteria of future use through reasonable improvements depends on 
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 712 (1940), a Commerce Clause case, it 
is not good precedent in admiralty cases. Nevertheless, because of the conceptual simplicity of 
the past, present, or future analysis in Rochester Gas, it has been used in several admiralty cases. 
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This test has been most clearly articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Fin-
neseth v. Carter 131 and the Fourth Circuit in Price v. Price. 132 It was 
implicitly adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Richardson v. Foremost In-
surance Co. 133 
The strongest argument advanced in favor of the navigational ca-
pacity standard, and against the contemporary navigability-in-fact 
standard, is that a definition based on the presence or absence of com-
mercial activity is unstable.134 As the Finneseth court observed, 
if current or present commercial maritime activity is th.e test, a ferry 
could operate on Dale Hollow Lake between Kentucky and Tennessee 
one day and go out of business the next and tortious occurrences hap-
pening on each of the two days would be subject to different rules of 
conduct and liability.135 
This instability causes significant problems for courts applying the 
contemporary navigability-in-fact standard. As a result, decisions 
have turned on such trivial facts as whether or not the post office used 
a boat to deliver the maiJ.136 
A definition of navigability based on the amount of commerce also 
leads to problems in dividing a waterway into navigable and nonnavi-
gable sections.137 This problem is easily surmounted in cases like 
See, e.g., Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Costing, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968), revd. on other 
grounds sub nom. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969); Sawczyk v. United 
States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Jones v. Duke Power Co., 501 F. Supp. 
713 (W.D.N.C. 1980), affd., 672 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981); Stallworth v. McFarland, 350 F. Supp. 
920 (W.D. La. 1972), affd., 493 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1974); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr., 
Assocs., 328 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Ark. 1971), ajfd., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972). 
131. 712 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1983). 
132. 929 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1991). 
133. 641F.2d314 (5th Cir. 1981), ajfd. sub nom. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 
668 (1982); see Respess v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1984); Duke v. United 
States, 711 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Tex. 1989). 
134. See Price v. Price, 929 F.2d 131, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1991); Finneseth 712 F.2d at 1046-47; 
cf. Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 641 F.2d 314, 316 (5th Cir. 1981). 
135. Finneseth, 712 F.2d at 1047. Finneseth can be distinguished from Adams v. Montana 
Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975), and Chapman v. United States, 575 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978)- two important cases using the contemporary navigability-in-
fact standard, see supra section II.A - on the grounds that unlike Dale Hollow Lake, the lakes 
in question were located entirely within a single state. If, however, the true test is the presence, 
or likelihood, of commerce, this appears to be a distinction without difference. The federal inter-
est in protecting maritime commerce is no greater on interstate as opposed to intrastate lakes. 
But see infra section 11.C. 
136. Compare Minix v. Fellers, 654 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1987) with Davis v. United 
States, 185 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 932 (1951). 
137. See Wilder v. Placid Oil Co., 611 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. La. 1985) (was the Catahoula 
Lake portion of the Little River navigable?), ajfd. sub nom. Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 
1394 (5th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Duke Power Co., 501 F. Supp. 713 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (was Lake 
Norman on the Catawba River navigable?), ajfd., 672 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981); Sawczyk v. 
United States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (was the Niagara River naviga-
ble below Niagara Falls?). A few courts have also been asked - but all have declined - to 
define parts of the ocean or the Great Lakes as nonnavigable because of lack of commercial 
activity at a particular spot. See, e.g., In re Paradise Holdings Co., 795 F.2d 756 (9th Cir.), cert. 
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Adams, which arise on artificial lakes closed by dams, 138 but not for 
those arising on inland rivers and lakes with potentially navigable out-
lets and tributaries. 
Proponents of the navigational capacity standard maintain that 
The Daniel Ball and The Montello definitions speak in terms of naviga-
tional capacity and should be construed broadly.139 
No Supreme court case imposes the requirement that navigability only 
exists, for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, if the lake or river is cur-
rently or presently being used as a highway for interstate commerce. 
This requirement has been imposed, however, by the Eighth Circuit [in 
Livingston], despite the contrary language of futurity, such as "suscepti-
bility," "capability," and "may be" conducted or carried on, in early 
Supreme Court cases.140 
The context of the early cases supports this argument. Throughout 
the nineteenth century the Court pursued a vigorous policy of ex-
panding admiralty jurisdiction to places where commerce might 
follow. 141 
Several courts adopting the navigational capacity standard have 
also argued that the federal interest in protecting maritime commerce 
is best served by uniform administration of activities on potentially 
navigable waters.142 Under this view, admiralty and Commerce 
Clause-based regulations of navigation are seen not so much as clearly 
separable federal interests but as part of a cohesive regulatory 
scheme.143 This argument is logically sound but ignores the consistent 
distinction maintained by the Supreme Court between admiralty and 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.144 
denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1986); McCormick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1982); Kozan 
v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
138. Adams, 528 F.2d at 439. 
139. Price, 929 F.2d at 134; Finneseth, 712 F.2d at 1045. 
140. Finneseth, 712 F.2d at 1045. 
141. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852), The Daniel 
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871), and The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874), greatly 
expanded the waters subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Of course, one might argue that because 
maritime is now contracting, admiralty should contract as well. Cf. supra notes 117-19 and 
accompanying text. 
142. See Price, 929 F.2d at 133-34; Finneseth, 712 F.2d at 1046-47; Richardson, 641 F.2d at 
316. 
143. This argument finds support in Justice Marshall's reasoning in Foremost Ins. Co. v. 
Richardson: 
Although the primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is unquestionably the protection of 
maritime commerce, petitioners take too narrow a view of the federal interest sought to be 
protected. The federal interest in protecting maritime commerce cannot be adequately 
served if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individuals actually engaged in mari-
time activity. This interest can be fully vindicated only if all operators of vessels on naviga-
ble waters are subject to uniform rules of conduct. The failure to recognize the breadth of 
this federal interest ignores the potential effect of noncommercial maritime activity on mari-
time commerce. 
457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982). 
144. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
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A final argument ·advanced in favor of the navigational capacity 
standard is that it provides easy access to the federal courts. In con-
trast to courts that use definitions of navigability to restrict jurisdic-
tion, the Richardson court viewed its role more expansively: 
"Jurisdiction should be as readily ascertainable as courts can make it. 
If the waterway is capable of being used in commerce, that is a suffi-
cient threshold to invoke admiralty jurisdiction."145 The different phi-
losophies of the Richardson and Adams courts represent an 
unresolvable difference of opinion about the role of the federal 
courts.146 The jurisdictional rule chosen, however, can have serious 
consequences. A plaintiff whose case is dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion based solely on the definition of navigable waters may be denied 
access to any forum, and therefore denied any remedy.147 
In summary, there are sound arguments for the navigational ca-
pacity standard based on its certainty, uniformity, and consistency 
with precedent. Weaker arguments stem from a desire for comprehen-
sive regulation of all maritime activities and a desire to provide easy 
access to the federal courts. 
C. Is an Interstate Nexus Required? 
The Finneseth court interpreted Supreme Court precedent as re-
quiring admiralty jurisdiction over waters that form an interstate 
nexus.148 This section considers whether admiralty jurisdiction can be 
determined by geography alone. Three types of waterways are dis-
cussed: those connecting two or more states, those located in a single 
state but that combine with others to connect two or more states, and 
those landlocked entirely within a single state. 
'Ihere is little dispute that lakes or rivers that lie on the border 
between two states, large rivers that flow through two or more states, 
and rivers that empty into the sea are navigable for admiralty pur-
poses.149 This is true whether or not there is evidence of commerce on 
145. Richardson, 641 F.2d at 316. 
146. Compare the Richardson policy with Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th 
Cir. 1975), which stated: 
No purpose is served by application of a uniform body of Federal law, on waters devoid of 
trade or commerce, to regulate the activities and resolve disputes of pleasure boaters .... 
Only the burdening of Federal courts and the frustrating of the purposes of state tort law 
would be thereby served. 
528 F.2d at 440-41. 
147. E.g., Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (W.D. La. 1981) (plaintiff time 
barred from bringing state tort action); Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191, 193 (W.D. 
Mo. 1980) (plaintiff left with no remedy after admiralty suit dismissed because the statute of 
limitations for the cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act had expired). 
148. Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041, 1044 (6th Cir. 1983). 
149. Price v. Price, 929 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1991) (lake on the border of Virginia and North 
Carolina); Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1983) (lake on the border of Kentucky 
and Tennessee); Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975) (lake on 
the border of Virginia and North Carolina); Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 486 F.2d 1097 (3d 
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the body of water in question.150 Only one reported case in the past 
thirty years found a river emptying into the sea nonnavigable for ad-
miralty purposes. In Marroni v. Matey 151 the court held that a section 
of the Delaware River was not navigable because there was no evi-
dence of commerce in that area.152 With the exception of Marroni, 
determinations that interstate bodies of water are navigable seem to 
rest simply on the observation that they are capable of serving as high-
ways for interstate commerce.153 
The same reasoning holds true for waterways that connect with 
others to form a continuous interstate highway. Most courts have de-
fined such waters as navigable.154 The Livingston decision is a promi-
nent exception.155 The case concerned an accident on the Norfolk 
River in Arkansas, which eventually flows into the Mississippi below 
the site of the accident.156 The court's reasoning turned on the fact 
that the accident occurred near the Norfolk hydroelectric dam that 
had eliminated waterborne commerce in the area, 157 but it ignored the 
fact that the accident occurred below the dam. Because the accident 
situs was on a continuous interstate waterway, the Livingston decision 
was criticized by the Finneseth court for discounting the importance of 
the interstate nexus.1ss 
Waters confined to a single state present more difficult 
problems.159 Two types of waterways must be distinguished: those 
that are naturally landlocked, and those, like the lake in Adams, that 
were once connected with other waters but have become landlocked 
Cir. 1973) (Ohio River); Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973) (Mississippi River), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); Hartman v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 114 (D.S.C. 1981) (lake on 
the border of North and South Carolina); Stallworth v. McFarland, 350 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. La. 
1972), affd., 493 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1974) (lake on the border of Texas and Louisiana); Spiller v. 
Thomas M. Lowe Assocs., 328 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (Red River}, affd., 466 F.2d 903 
(8th Cir. 1972). 
150. E.g., Price, 929 F.2d 131; Finneseth, 712 F.2d 1041; Richards, 528 F.2d 745. 
151. 492 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
152. 492 F. Supp. at 342. 
153. See Finneseth, 712 F.2d at 1044 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 
(1871)). 
154. Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1988); Richardson v. Foremost Ins. 
Co., 641 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1981), affd., 457 U.S. 899 (1982); Reynolds v. Blake Builders Supply, 
Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975); Duke v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Tex. 1989); 
Truehart v. Blandon, 672 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. La. 1987); Wilder v. Placid Oil Co., 611 F. Supp. 
841 (W.D. La. 1985); Respess v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1984); Sawczyk v. 
United States Coast Guard, 499 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D.N.Y. 1980). 
155. Livingston v. United States, 627 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 914 
(1981). See supra section II.A. 
156. 627 F.2d at 166-67. 
157. 627 F.2d at 170. 
158. Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041, 1045 (6th Cir. 1983). 
159. For a discussion of cases decided before 1969 dealing with intrastate lakes, see Ralph 
McCaughan, Federal Maritime Jurisdiction Over Inland Intrastate Lakes, 26 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. l (1969). 
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by lockless dams. In the few cases in the first category, all but one of 
the naturally landlocked lakes in a single state were held to be non-
navigable.160 Interestingly, however, none of these cases was decided 
solely on the lack of an interstate nexus. In each case the court based 
its ruling, at least in part, on a finding that the lake did not support 
commerce. If the interstate nexus requirement is deemed dispositive, 
such an analysis would be unnecessary. 
A more frequent situation is the case of dams built across previ-
ously navigable rivers. Most courts faced with the issue have followed 
the Adams reasoning161 and held that when a waterway loses the ca-
pacity to support commercial traffic it ceases to be navigable for admi-
ralty purposes.162 The two cases holding otherwise appear to have 
been overruled.163 
Decisions such as Adams, however, do present doctrinal difficul-
ties. Because The Daniel Ball and The Montello refer to a waterway's 
navigability in its "natural state," some courts have suggested that the 
navigability of a dam-made lake should tum on the navigability of the 
underlying river.164 This rationale has played an important role in 
Commerce Clause and property cases.165 Similarly, -the Appalachian 
160. Stother v. Bren Lynn Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. La.), ajfd., 834 F.2d 1023 (5th 
Cir. 1987); Minix v. Fellers, 654 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Oseredzuk v. Warner Co., 354 
F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Pa. 1972), ajfd., 485 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 
(1974); Doran v. Lee, 287 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1968). The only case found where a naturally 
landlocked lake was held to be navigable was In re Rowley, 425 F. Supp. 116 (D. Idaho 1977), 
concerning Lake Coeur d'Alene in Idaho. The parties had stipulated that the lake is 
totally within the boundaries of the State ofldaho and by the use of the waters of the lake it 
is not possible to reach ports of call other than in the State of Idaho without removing the 
vessel or boat onto land and transporting it to another body of water. 
425 F. Supp. at 117-18. The judge held the lake to be navigable for admiralty purposes based on 
a Coast Guard determination that the lake was navigable. 425 F. Supp. at 118. Such a basis for 
a determination of navigability is unjustified as the determinations of administrative officers are 
not controlling. See supra note 100. Rowley should be dismissed as a poorly reasoned anomaly. 
161. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975). 
162. Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. v. Marts, 878 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(Three Buoys I), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct. 3265, modified, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(Three Buoys II), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 272 (1991); Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 
437 (9th Cir. 1975); Reynolds v. Bradley, 644 F. Supp. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Reed v. United 
States, 604 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Motley v. Hale, 567 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Va. 1983); 
Dunham v. DeMaine, 559 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 
1265 (W.D. La. 1981); Jones v. Duke Power Co., 501 F. Supp. 713 (W.D.N.C. 1980), ajfd., 672 
F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981); Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Mo. 1980); In re 
Stevens, 341 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Ga. 1965); In re River Queen, 275 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Ark. 
1967), ajfd., 402 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1968). 
163. See Loe-Wood Boat & Motors v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957), overruled by 
Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. v. Marts, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990) (Three Buoys 
II); Madole v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. La. 1965), superseded by Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 
514 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. La. 1981); see also Land & Lake Tours, Inc. v. Lewis, 738 F.2d 961 
(8th Cir. 1984). 
164. Watring v. Unnamed Inboard Motor Boat No. WV 4488 AB, 322 F. Supp. 1226, 1228 
(S.D. W. Va. 1971); Madole, 241 F. Supp. at 382. 
165. For instance, in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926), title to land which 
had been underwater but was uncovered at the time of the case depended on whether the lake 
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Electric doctrine of immutable navigability, which has been used ex-
tensively in admiralty cases, 166 suggests that damming a river should 
not necessarily remove it from admiralty jurisdiction. To dismiss 
these arguments, courts have relied heavily on the distinction between 
admiralty and other types of cases involving navigable waters. 167 
Declaring that intrastate lakes large enough to support substantial 
commerce are nonnavigable for admiralty purposes is more difficult. 
For example, the Lake of the Ozarks in Missouri, which has been the 
site of several accidents giving rise to admiralty claims, 168 supports 
some commercial shipping and transportation.169 In denying admi-
ralty jurisdiction to cases arising on the lake, the Eighth Circuit drew 
a bright line between intra- and interstate commerce in the physical 
sense.170 Thus, for admiralty purposes, interstate commerce occurs 
only when a vessel actually moves between two states. This reasoning 
seems contrary to The Montello, which established the principle that 
vessels on intrastate voyages were subject to admiralty jurisdiction if 
they carried goods moving in interstate commerce. 171 The two cases 
may be reconciled, however, by reading The Montello and other early 
cases as basing admiralty jurisdiction on the interstate character of the 
waterway, not on the status of the vessel. 172 The Eighth Circuit has 
recognized this, 173 and its definition of navigability seems to have re-
turned full circle to that first laid down in The Daniel Ball: whether 
the waterway is physically capable of serving as a highway for inter-
state transportation and commerce. 
Based on the above analysis, almost all the cases concerning inland 
waters can be reconciled under the principle that admiralty jurisdic-
had been navigable in its natural state. 270 U.S. at 50, 56. Similarly, in Economy Light & Power 
Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921), the navigability of the Desplaines River was unaffected 
by changes including the draining of a nearby swamp, clearing of a forest (which reduced runofl), 
and diversion of water into a canal. 256 U.S. at 117-18. 
166. See supra note 118. 
167. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Three Buoys 
Houseboat Vacations U.S.A., Ltd., 689 F. Supp. 958, 961-62 (E.D. Mo. 1988), ajfd. sub nom. 
Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. v. Morts, 878 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (Three Buoys 
I), vacated and remanded 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990), modified, Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations 
U.S.A. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir.) (Three Buoys II), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 272 (1991); 
Motley v. Hale, 567 F. Supp. 39, 41-42 (W.D. Va. 1983); Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 
1265 (W.D. La. 1981). 
168. Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. v. Morts, 878 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(Three Buoys I), vacated and remanded 110 S. Ct. 3265 (1990), modified, Three Buoys House-
boat Vacations U.S.A. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990) (Three Buoys II), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 272 (1991); Loe-Wood Boat & Motors v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957), overruled 
by Three Buoys II; Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
169. Three Buoys/, 878 F.2d at 1099. 
170. Three Buoys]/, 921 F.2d at 779; Three Buoys/, 878 F.2d at 1099. 
171. The Montello, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 411, 415 (1870); see also Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629, 
632 (1884); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 640 (1868). 
172. See supra text at notes 50-54. 
173. Three Buoys I/, 921 F.2d at 777. 
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tion only extends over waterways physically capable of carrying ves-
sels engaged in commerce between the states. Interstate bodies of 
water clearly qualify, as do those that connect with interstate water-
ways. Conversely, waters landlocked in a single state, whether natu-
rally so or because of dams, are not navigable for admiralty purposes. 
The foregoing review of conflicting standards of navigability 
reveals three strong principles that are combined in a comprehensive 
system in Part III. First, the doctrine of immutable navigability 
should not apply in admiralty. When a waterway loses its capacity to 
support interstate commerce, it should cease to be subject to federal 
jurisdiction. Second, determination of navigability should tum on the 
characteristics of the waterway itself, not on the presence or absence of 
commerce. Such a requirement is inherently unstable. Third, to be 
considered navigable, a waterway must be part of an interstate nexus. 
III. PROPOSED ANALYTICAL SCHEME FOR DEFINING NAVIGABLE 
WATERS 
In Part II, this Note described considerable disagreement among 
courts attempting to define navigable waters, but suggested that syn-
thesis is possible. Resolving the conflict requires addressing three is-
sues. First, any definition must clearly address a federal interest. 
Second, a framework for applying aging Supreme Court precedents to 
modem situations must be developed. Third, substantive differences 
about the role of interstate commerce in the definition of navigability 
must be resolved. 
This Part proposes an analytical scheme for determining navigabil-
ity in particular cases. It draws from all the competing definitions de-
scribed in Part II to provide a workable system that incorporates the 
major goals of each. Section III.A describes the policies and interests 
the system is designed to advance. The system itself is defined and 
defended in section 111.B. The important Supreme Court precedents 
are integrated at each step of the analysis. 
A. The Federal Admiralty Interest and Navigable Waters 
The primary federal interest served by admiralty courts is the pro-
vision of a specialized forum to administer a unique system of law that 
serves the special needs of the shipping industry.174 The federal inter-
est, however, is not exclusively defined by the shipping industry. 
Rather, an independent federal interest exists in maintaining jurisdic-
tion over the waters that form the highways capable of carrying inter-
state commerce.175 Given this jurisdictional mandate, the federal 
courts have an interest in developing a straightforward, predictable 
174. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 1, at 29; Black, supra note 5, at 261. 
175. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
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test for identifying navigable waters. Justice Scalia has criticized the 
nexus test for bogging down the courts in a cumbersome analysis of 
what constitutes a traditional maritime activity. "[A]n enormous 
amount of expensive legal ability will be used up on jurisdictional is-
sues when it could be much better spent upon elucidating the merits of 
cases. In short, a trial judge ought to be able to tell easily and fast 
what belongs in his court and what has no business there."176 Justice 
Scalia's criticisms apply equally well to definitions of navigability 
based on such tenuous findings as whether a ferry was operating on 
the day of an accident.177 Judicial inquiry will always be necessary 
when the navigability of a particular waterway is challenged, but the 
scheme proposed below should make the defining process more effi-
cient and accurate. 
B. Defining Navigable Waters 
The conflict among competing definitions of navigability stems pri-
marily from two misunderstandings about the role of interstate com-
merce in that definition. First, courts have focused on the inter- or 
intrastate nature of the commerce, not of the waterway itself.178 Sec-
ond, some courts have transformed the general federal interest into a 
requirement that commerce actually or potentially exist. 179 The pro-
posed scheme redirects attention to the physical characteristics of the 
waterway in question. Analysis of the type, amount, or likelihood of 
commerce is discarded in favor of a simpler inquiry into whether inter-
state transportation is possible on a particular body of water. 
Determining whether a body of water is navigable for admiralty 
purposes rests on five basic principles: 
(i) Waters must be part of an interstate nexus. 
(ii) Waters may become, or cease to be, navigable as circumstances war-
rant. The doctrine of immutable navigability is rejected. 
(iii) Waters currently supporting interstate commerce are by definition 
considered navigable. 
(iv) Waters that formerly supported interstate commerce are presumed 
to be navigable. 
(v) Waters that have never supported interstate commerce are pre-
sumed to be nonnavigable. 
The sections that follow discuss each of these principles in detail. 
176. Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2902 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 312 (1950)). 
177. See supra text accompanying note 135; Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041, 1046-47 
(6th Cir. 1983). 
178. See supra section 11.C. 
179. See supra section II.A. 
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1. Interstate Nexus Required 
Both Supreme Court precedent and the interests those decisions 
attempted to protect suggest that navigable waters. must be part of an 
interstate nexus.180 The most direct suggestion is. The Daniel Ball's 
explicit distinction between the "navigable waters of the United 
States," and the "navigable waters of the States."181 The navigable 
waters of the United States form part of "a continued highway over 
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign 
countries."182 Even more explicit is the definition of navigable waters 
in Ex parte Boyer: "a highway for commerce between ports and places 
in different States."1s3 The fundamental concern underlying these def-
initions is that admiralty jurisdiction should tum on the interstate na-
ture of the water, not the type of activity occurring there.184 
Requiring an interstate nexus eliminates from admiralty jurisdic-
tion all accidents occurring on waters landlocked within a single state, 
regardless of their capacity to support commerce. Excluding those in-
trastate bodies of water that are large enough to support commercial 
activity such as the Lake of the Ozarks185 is at first troubling. It could 
be argued that if the primary interest of admiralty jurisdiction is to 
serve the needs of the commercial shipping industry, that interest 
should encompass all shipping, wherever it occurs. Commercial ship-
ping, however, as used to define admiralty jurisdiction, has a very spe-
cific meaning. The federal interest in interstate waters depends on the 
federal interest in the actual interstate movement of goods by water, a 
different idea than the modem notion of interstate commerce.186 Fur-
thermore, such cases are rare and the utility of a clearly applicable rule 
outweighs potential objections in unusual instances.187 
Only waters capable of supporting uninterrupted interstate travel 
should be considered navigable. The Montello's rule that waters may 
still be defined as navigable despite occasional obstacles should be dis-
carded.188 The rule is outdated and at odds with the principle that 
180. See supra sections II.A, 11.B. 
181. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). 
182. 77 U.S. at 563. 
183. 109 U.S. 629, 632 (1884). 
184. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
187. Again, Justice Scalia's criticism of the nexus test provides a useful analogy. 
The time expended on such rare freakish cases will be saved many times over by a clear 
jurisdictional rule that makes it unnecessary to decide, in hundreds of other cases, what 
particular activities aboard a vessel are "traditionally maritime" in nature and what effect a 
particular tort will have on maritime commerce. 
Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2902 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
188. The Montello held the Fox River to be navigable in its natural state despite the need for 
occasional portages. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 442-43 (1874). 
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only those waters capable of serving as highways for commerce should 
be considered navigable. Customary modes of waterborne commerce, 
an underemphasized element of The Daniel Ball definition, 189 no 
longer include portages around rapids and sandbars. To satisfy the 
modem interstate nexus test, a waterway should be capable of sup-
porting uninterrupted navigation from one state to another. 
2. Immutable Navigability Does Not Apply 
The doctrine of immutable navigability was developed to justify 
expansive federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 190 The rule 
is also essential in property law to assure stable title. 191 Immutable 
navigability, however, is inappropriate in admiralty. When the physi-
cal characteristics of a waterway change to make it incapable of serv-
ing as a highway between the states, the waterway should drop out of 
admiralty jurisdiction.192 
The requirement that a waterway's navigability should be deter-
mined from its "natural state," first announced in The Montello, 193 
should also be discarded. The Supreme Court itself has held that for-
merly nonnavigable waters may become navigable for admiralty pur-
poses through "improvements."194 The converse should also be true. 
Admiralty jurisdiction should not include waterways that have been 
modified and are no longer navigable. Determinations that watenvays 
are no longer navigable, however, should be made cautiously and 
should only be based on substantial physical changes. Most obviously, 
building a lockless dam to create an intrastate lake with no navigable 
outlets would qualify as a substantial change.195 
The doctrine of immutable navigability should also not apply when 
a waterway undergoes a substantial natural change. Cutting off an 
oxbow from a major river would constitute a substantial change. A 
temporary reduction in a river's flow due to a period of drought, how-
ever, would not qualify. Similarly, a seasonal reduction in flow should 
189. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871). 
190. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra note 93-94 and accompanying text. 
192. The reasoning in Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975), is con-
vincing. See supra note 114. 
193. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874). Similarly, The Daniel Ball speaks of a waterway's 
"ordinary condition." 77 U.S. at 563. 
194. The Supreme Court has spoken most extensively about "improvements" in Commerce 
Clause cases. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. The scheme described here rejects the 
Appalachian Electric doctrine, which includes as navigable those waters that may become so 
through future improvements. Waters are only navigable for admiralty purposes when the im-
provements have actually been made. See, e.g., Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884) (a canal). 
For an excellent discussion of the limits of the improvements doctrine in an admiralty context, 
see Oseredzuk v. Warner Co., 354 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Pa. 1972), ajfd., 485 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 
1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1978). 
195. See Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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not bar admiralty jurisdiction as long as the waterway is regularly usa-
ble as an interstate highway. 196 Rejecting the doctrine of immutable 
navigability does not, however, justify a determination of nonnavi-
gability based on a finding that commerce has ceased.197 Resolving 
questions of navigability for waters that have fallen out of use is dis-
cussed in section IIl.B.4. 
Rejecting the doctrine of immutable navigability also protects the 
expectations of the parties. People base their decisions and actions on 
contemporary circumstances. It makes little sense to rest a jurisdic-
tional ruling, which may have a significant impact on liability, 198 on an 
outdated set of facts and circumstances.199 Courts should be free to 
reexamine the navigability of a waterway whenever circumstances 
warrant. 200 In every individual case a federal court must examine its 
jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter anew.201 Jurisdiction 
over a particular place should be similarly reviewed. 
3. Waters Currently Used for Commerce Are Considered Navigable 
An interstate nexus is necessary but not sufficient for a waterway 
to be navigable. The caveat quoted in The Montello has as much force 
today as it did in 1874.202 Not every creek or pond that happens to 
fall on a border and is capable of floating a canoe should be navigable 
for admiralty purposes. The task should be identifying those interstate 
waters that should be considered navigable. 
196. See Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (5th Cir. 1988) (lake still naviga-
ble for admiralty jurisdiction despite being passable only certain parts of the year). Although 
developed in a different context, reasoning from Appalachian Elec. is persuasive. "[It is not] 
necessary for navigability that the use of a river should be continuous. The character of the 
region, its products and the difficulties or dangers of the navigation influence the regularity and 
extent of the use." United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. 311 U.S. 377, 409 (1940). 
197. The portion of the Adams reasoning that turns on present use is rejected because of its 
uncertainty and instability. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. The reasoning that 
turns on "potential" use is adopted, but only insofar as it applies to the physical characteristics of 
the waterway. 
198. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
199. This is one of the strongest arguments advocated by proponents of the contemporary 
navigability-in-fact standard. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
200. For example, in Cooper v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 200, 204 (W.D. Mo. 1980), a 
district court complained that it was compelled to assert jurisdiction by a prior decision declaring 
the lake in question navigable. After the Eighth Circuit decided Livingston v. United States, 627 
F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1980), which rejected the doctrine of immutable navigability, the district court 
unhesitatingly reversed its order, declared the lake nonnavigable, declined jurisdiction, and dis-
missed the suit. Cooper v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
201. See, e.g., Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th 
Cir. 1986); FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(3). 
202. It is not every ditch, in which the salt water ebbs and flows, through the extensive 
salt marshes along the coast, and which serve to admit and drain off the salt water from the 
marshes, which can be considered a navigable stream. Nor is it every small creek, in which 
a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float, at high water which is deemed 
navigable. 
Rowe v. Granite Bridge Corp., 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 344, 347 (1839); see also supra note 73. 
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A waterway should be defined as navigable based on its physical 
capacity to support interstate commerce. Unfortunately, a definition 
based only on physical features such as the depth of a lake or the 
width of a river is inadequate. Such a rule would be both arbitrary 
and based on an assumption about how large a waterway must be to be 
capable of supporting commercial navigation. Thus, it is impossible to 
determine a waterway's navigational capacity without considering the 
types of activities it actually supports. Evidence of use or nonuse 
should be used to make a broader finding about a waterway's physical 
capacity to support commercial navigation. Evidence of current use is 
evidence of that capacity. Therefore, waterways currently used for 
commerce are conclusively presumed to be navigable. 
4. Waters Formerly Used for Commerce Are Presumed Navigable 
Waters that once supported commercial traffic are presumed to be 
navigable because that use is evidence of their navigational capacity. 
This presumption of navigability is, however, subject to two condi-
tions. First, the waterway must not have undergone a significant 
physical change since the cessation of commercial activity that would 
prevent the resumption of such activity. Second, the past type of com-
mercial activity must be reasonably likely to resume in the foreseeable 
future. It is a technical inquiry. On the one hand, a waterway should 
not be perpetually navigable because fur trappers once paddled 
there;203 but, on the other, a river should not cease to be navigable just 
because the ferry goes out of business.204 
At first, such a technical rule seems at odds with the admonition in 
The Montello that navigability should not be determined by the type 
or method of commercial activity.205 The Montello, however, should 
be read as expressing incomplete Supreme Court doctrine on the ques-
tion of navigability. In deciding The Montello, the Court was faced 
with its then very recent precedent of The Daniel Ball, which required 
that navigability be assessed from a waterway's ordinary condition.206 
It was also faced with a factual situation seemingly at odds with this 
requirement. The Fox River could not, in its natural state, have sup-
ported the steamboat that was the subject of the action.207 Thus, the 
203. See e.g., The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874). Similarly the kind of evidence 
used to support a finding of navigability for title purposes in Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 
(1971), see supra note 102, would not support a finding of navigability for admiralty purposes. 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36. 
205. The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441-42. 
206. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871). 
207. It is said, however, that although the Fox River inay now be considered a highway 
for commerce, over which trade and travel are, or may be, conducted in the ordinary modes 
of trade and, travel on water, it was not so in its natural state, and therefore, is not a naviga-
ble water of the United States within the purview of the decisions referred to. 
The Montello, 87 U.S. at 440. 
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Court confronted a conflict between the expressed rule and the policy 
behind it. Instead of extending the definition of navigability to include 
"improved" waterways as it did in later decisions,2°8 the Court chose a 
more conservative course. It used evidence of prior use to support a 
finding that the river was navigable in its natural state.209 The expan-
sion of the definition of navigable waters in subsequent cases makes 
such an analysis unnecessary today. Now only inquiry into whether 
the waterway, in its current state, is capable of supporting commerce 
in the "customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by 
water"210 is necessary. 
Judge Stagg's reasoning in Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 211 is an example 
of how to apply The Daniel Ball's requirements in a modern setting. 
It is common knowledge that since the dam was constructed at Lake 
Bistineau the lake has not been susceptible of use for commercial ship-
ping and, in fact, has been used exclusively for recreational activities. 
One simply would not expect to see, and would not see, tugboats, barges, 
or any other type of commercial vessel on Lake Bistineau.212 
For large interstate lakes, such as the one in Finneseth, applying 
such reasoning will be difficult.213 If the Smith reasoning turns on a 
finding of probability, then it is error. But if the passage reflects a 
determination about the physical characteristics of the lake itself, then 
it is an excellent model.214 In borderline cases, it seems appropriate to 
err on the side of navigability. Deciding conclusively that a previously 
navigable waterway is no longer capable of supporting commercial 
traffic seems to require greater certainty than conceding that it could 
be used again.215 
208. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
209. The Montello, 87 U.S at 440-41. 
210. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563. 
211. 514 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. La. 1981). 
212. 514 F. Supp. at 1268-69. Such reasoning should, of course, be used cautiously. Under 
the method of analysis presented here, Lake Bistineau could have been declared nonnavigable 
simply because the dam removed it from an interstate nexus. Nevertheless, Judge Stagg's consid-
eration of whether the current customary modes of commerce were possible on the lake is a good 
example of applying The Daniel Ball in a contemporary setting. 
· 213. The Finneseth court apparently felt constrained by the "liberal definition given to 'cus-
tomary modes of trade and travel on water' [in The Montello]." Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 
1041, 1044 (6th Cir. 1983). If, as argued here, The Montello's "liberal" rule does not necessarily 
control, see supra text accompanying notes 205-10, the inquiry should extend only to the com-
mon types of contemporary commercial vessels. 
214. It is, however, troubling that Lake Bistineau is "30 or 40 miles long, [and] from 1 to 2 
miles wide." Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. La. 1981) (quoting Sapp v. 
Frazier, 26 So. 378, 379 (La. 1899)). Because of its large size it seems at least possible that the 
lake may be capable of supporting some type of commercial activity. 
215. In specific cases like Finneseth, a finding of navigability serves another judicial interest. 
In Finneseth it was uncertain whether the accident occurred in Kentucky or Tennessee. 712 F.2d 
at 1042. Thus the choice of laws problem was not simply between state and federal law but 
between three possible alternatives. In such cases a choice of federal law seems a safe middle 
course. 
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5. Waters Never Used for Commerce Are Presumed Nonnavigable 
Waters that have never been used for commercial transportation 
should be presumed to be nonnavigable for admiralty purposes. Ex-
tensive and regular use by recreational boaters, however, may demon-
strate the waterway's physical capacity to support commerce. A 
finding that such a waterway is navigable should be made even more 
cautiously than a determination that a formerly navigable watenvay 
no longer is. The federal interest in exerting jurisdiction over histori-
cally unused bodies of water is minimal. 
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court expanded the waters 
subject to admiralty jurisdiction in response to a dramatic increase in 
commercial activity.216 Similar considerations should still apply. In 
contrast to situations discussed above, here a consideration of the like-
lihood of commercial activity is relevant to whether a particular wa-
terway should be considered navigable. An inquiry into whether 
waters historically not used for commerce are navigable for admiralty 
purposes should proceed in two steps. 
Initially, the nature and extent of currently ongoing waterborne 
activity should be evaluated to determine whether a waterway is physi-
cally capable of supporting contemporary commerce. If not, the wa-
terway is not navigable for admiralty purposes. If the watenvay is 
physically capable then inquiry should be made into whether commer-
cial use is foreseeable. 
Most important in the foreseeability inquiry is the level of commer-
cial activity on nearby or connected bodies of water. If such activity is 
common, and is likely to expand into the waterway in question, then a 
finding of navigability for admiralty purposes is justifiable. If there is 
no waterborne commercial activity nearby then a finding of navigabil-
ity is probably unwarranted. Considering the level of commercial ac-
tivity for this limited category of waterways protects the federal 
interest in highways of waterborne commerce when appropriate but 
does not impose it unnecessarily. When circumstances change suffi-
ciently to warrant a new finding of navigability then such determina-
tions should be possible. 
The principles developed in this Part describe a workable system of 
determining when waters are navigable for admiralty purposes. As a 
threshold matter such waters must be part of an interstate nexus form-
ing a continuous highway for waterborne commerce between the 
states. Determinations of navigability should be based on the physical 
characteristics of the waterway. Evidence of use or nonuse should be 
used to determine a waterway's capacity to support commercial trans-
portation. The likelihood of such use is only germane when consider-
216. See supra notes 75-78 and 117 and accompanying text. 
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ing whether to define as navigable waters which have not previously 
been used for commerce. 
The system described has several advantages. It establishes clear 
jurisdictional rules which will quickly resolve most questions of navi-
gability. It establishes an analytical framework for evaluating evi-
dence pertaining to navigability in the few borderline cases that will 
arise. Because it emphasizes the physical characteristics of the water-
way, rather than the activities occurring there, the system is stable and 
predictable. Finally, the scheme avoids treating particular types of ac-
tivity, like recreational boating, as relevant to the definition of naviga-
bility, focusing attention on the nexus test to determine whether 
particular cases should be subject to admiralty jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Defining precisely which waters should be considered navigable for 
admiralty purposes has proven difficult for several reasons. Although 
the concept of navigability plays an important role in several contexts 
unrelated to admiralty, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue 
for nearly a century, and the controlling precedents are outdated. 
Consequently, lower courts have split over the proper definition of 
navigability to apply in a modem context. The principal competing 
theories are the contemporary navigability in fact standard, which re-
quires evidence of actual or probable commercial activity, and the 
navigational capacity standard, which requires only that a waterway 
be physically capable of supporting interstate commerce. 
This Note resolves the conflict by proposing a simple set of pre-
sumptive rules for determining the navigability of a particular water-
way. For admiralty purposes the navigable waters of the United 
States are those that form part of an interstate nexus and that are 
physically capable of supporting commercial traffic. Elements of both 
the contemporary navigability in fact standard and the navigational 
capacity standard are combined to produce a system that reflects the 
major goals and concerns of each. The resulting system is constitu-
tionally sound, faithful to precedent, fulfills the goals of admiralty, and 
most importantly, is straightforward, predictable, and easy to apply. 
